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Abstract: 
This paper assesses the implications of discounting on a result derived by Bean (1998): that 
in a model of monetary policy where policy acts with a lag, the outcomes of monetary policy 
are very similar for a wide range of weightings of the (non-discounting) monetary authority’s 
objective function, with respect to inflation stability versus output stability.   We show that 
when the authority discounts the future, outcomes become more sensitive to preferences, and 
that it is important to take the discount rate into account when examining the  question of  
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1.  Introduction 
 
Here we address an important finding derived by Bean (1998). This finding, when applied to 
the new UK monetary arrangements, implies that “it does not matter that the inflation remit 
does not specify the relative weight that the Bank of England should place on output 
volatility vis-à-vis inflation volatility.” The result is obtained under the assumption that the 
authority does not discount the future.  In practice, however, some discounting is likely to 
occur and planning horizons might be relatively short; for the U.K., members of the 
Monetary Policy Committee are appointed for a term of three years, and so the average 
remaining term of existing members is one and a half years.  Given that a single time period 
in Bean (1998) is interpreted as corresponding to around one year, the assumption of no 
discounting by the central bank should not be taken for granted.  We examine how the above 
finding alters when discounting is introduced. 
 
Recent research in monetary policy has incorporated models with a more realistic treatment 
of the lag structure with which policy takes effect. Svennson (1997), Ball (1997) and Bean 
(1998) are recent examples.  In these models, optimal policy typically takes the form of a 
Taylor rule.
1  Bean (1998) demonstrates in this setting, that the weighting of the loss function 
of the monetary authority with respect to “output volatility vis-à-vis inflation volatility” does 
not affect the optimal policy rule in such a way as to greatly alter the outcome of stabilisation 
policy.  This can be seen in the shape of the Bean policy frontier (the set of efficient 
outcomes) which is relatively ‘rectangular.’  Figure (1), which will be described further 
below, shows the policy frontier and the optimal outcomes for two different weightings of the 
loss function.  These are ‘close,’ both in terms of their absolute distance relative to the 
magnitude of the variance of supply and demand shocks, and also in terms of the ratio of 
output volatility to inflation volatility obtained in each case. 
 
We find that this result is very robust to variations in the estimates of the parameters of the 
model.  This holds to such an extent that it is almost independent of the empirical analysis 
undertaken by Bean himself in the original paper – we find that the property of rectangularity 
holds for any set of plausible estimates. His analysis is therefore likely to apply to cases other 
than the U.K.  It can also be shown that except in the unrealistic case where policy affects 
inflation contemporaneously, the rectangularity result is also robust to simple variations in 
the lag structure used.  Our main finding is that the rectangularity result, however, is 
dependent on the planning horizon of the policymaker.  We argue that when discounting is 
introduced, the weighting of the loss function becomes increasingly important in affecting the 
trade-off.  
                                                 
1 In a model without lags, the interest rate is typically a linear function of current shocks.  When policy acts with 
a lag, the role of policy is to control the effects of past shocks which remain in the system via persistence. Policy  2
 
The essence of this argument goes as follows: here as is typical in models of monetary policy, 
the relative control of output or inflation deviations depends on the extent to which supply 
shocks are controlled – a tight control of supply shocks corresponds to tight control of 
inflation and lax control of output, and vice versa.  However, the variances of both future 
output and inflation depend positively on the amount of ‘inflationary pressure’ already within 
the system.  A myopic authority takes this as given and policy is sensitive to its preferences 
over output and inflation stability.  However, a far-sighted authority, regardless of its 
preferences, has an incentive to control inflation now since this will lower the future variance 
of both output and inflation.  This results in policy being less sensitive to preferences. 
 
Dynamic monetary policy models generally rely on some form of persistence in either output 
or inflation. For instance Lockwood, Miller and Zhang (1998) discuss persistence in 
employment while Mash (2000) discusses persistence in inflation. Both of these models are 
characterised by inflation bias, which results from the authority targeting a level of output 
higher than the natural rate.  The level of the discount rate is then shown to have implications 
for the consequent issues of time inconsistency and delegation; for instance Mash (2000) 
shows that an authority with long planning horizons offsets the problem of time 
inconsistency.  
 
Persistence can also be explored in the case where the authority targets the natural rate of 
output and hence there is no inflation bias.  Clark, Goodhart and Huang (1999) provide a 
discussion of the difference between policy made under commitment and discretion in the 
case where there is no inflation bias but there is persistence of inflation.  Bean also adopts a 
framework with persistence in inflation and without inflation bias (i.e. in which the authority 
targets the natural rate of output).
2 In comparison with the framework put forward by Clark et 
al., Bean places a greater emphasis on the lag structure and a lesser emphasis on the treatment 
of expectations.
3  What we show here is that in the Bean framework, planning horizons can 
have a significant impact on the rectangularity argument i.e. that if planning horizons are 
short, the relative weighting of inflation and output variability in the loss function does have a 
much greater impact on the outcome of optimal policy.   
 
                                                                                                                                                        
then acts by controlling persistence, and so the optimal interest rate is then often a function of the persisting 
variables rather than the shocks.  With simple lag structures, this can take the form of a Taylor rule. 
2 Bean argues that independence of the central bank is likely to achieve this situation, since it is then immune to 
the political pressures which cause output to be targeted at a level higher than the natural rate.  He also suggests 
that lengthening the term of MPC members would further insulate the MPC from short-term political pressures. 
Our analysis broadly supports this measure since it could also be expected to reduce discounting. 
3 This is of course entirely natural given the different issues that the models analyse.  For example, Clark et al. 
assume policy affects both output and inflation contemporaneously. However, taking into account that the 
policy instrument is the nominal rate, they allow a role for inflationary expectations in the evolution of output 
unlike the models of Ball (1997), Bean (1998) and Svensson (1997).  3
Section 2 provides an outline of the theoretical analysis presented by Bean (1998) and Ball 
(1997), and section 3 provides the corresponding analysis in the case of discounting.   
Svensson (1997) also solves this problem in the case of discounting; nevertheless, we present 
a solution here which stylistically is more in keeping with that of Ball (1997) and Bean 
(1998) since it allows a clearer discussion of rectangularity argument.
4 Section 4 discusses 
the implications of discounting on rectangularity and section 5 concludes. 
 
2.  An Outline of the Bean Model 
 
Bean (1998) and Ball (1997) use the following equations for aggregate demand and supply.  
Aggregate demand is given by 
 
η λ µ + + − = − − 1 1 y r y  with  η ~ N (0,ση
2)      ( D 1 )  
 




ε α π π + + = − − 1 1 y  with  ε ~ N (0,σε 
2)       ( S 1 )    
 
So real interest rates affect output with a lag of one period, output affects inflation with a 
further lag, and one period is interpreted as corresponding to a time span of around one year. 
The loss function of the non-discounting monetary authority is given by:  
 
  ) ( ) ( y Var Var L β π + =        ( L 1 )  
 
Bean provides a clear derivation of the optimal rule. The key observation is that the rule must 
be of the form: 
 
() y E Ey α π ρ π ρ + − = − = + + 1 1         ( 1 )  
 
The constant ρ is referred to as the ‘feedback parameter.’ Equation (1) implies that output 
moves in such a way that as far as possible past demand shocks, which increase the volatility 
of both output and inflation, are removed from the system. The level of ρ determines to what 
extent supply shocks, which have opposing effects on output and inflation volatility, are 
controlled – a high ρ corresponds to a tight control of supply shocks and so inflation. In 
effect, by imposing (1) we are choosing an efficient ‘sequencing’ matrix described below in 
                                                 
4 In particular of the feedback parameter, defined below.  Svennson’s solution, in many ways more direct, is 
ideal for his consideration of the inflation forecast as an intermediate target. 
5 This the reduced form of the equation  ε ζ ωπ π ω π + − + − + Ε − = 1 1 ) 1 ( y  where  ω
ζ α = .  4
(3). To see the mathematical basis for equation (1) - see Svensson (1997) - we simply 
recognise that Eyt+1 can be considered as the control variable for this dynamic problem. 
Maximising the loss function (which due to the linear-quadratic structure of the model is a 
quadratic function of expected inflation deviations) subject to the constraint (S1) gives a first 
order condition that is a rule of the form (1).  Equation (1) then determines the form of the 
optimal interest rate rule, which is a Taylor rule, 
 
  [] {} µ ρπ αρ λ / + + = y r         ( 2 )  
 
The current values of inflation and output in terms of last period’s values are then given by 
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It is important to note that the sequencing matrix is of rank 1 – in this system, this is a 
consequence of following an efficient policy given by (1). As will be described below, this 
rank condition can be seen as the essential cause of rectangularity in the case when there is no 
discounting.   
 
Equation (3) is used to calculate the unconditional variances:
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These expressions for the variances are substituted into the objective function (L1) and this 
allows us to calculate the value of the feedback parameter ρ that minimises the loss. This is 
the positive root of the equation: 
 
 0 1
2 = − +αρ βρ          ( 5 )  
 
The issue of the rectangularity of the policy frontier is easily described using (L1). Once the 
optimal rule has been implemented, for a wide range of values of β, there is a small 
difference in the final values of Var(y) and Var(π) that are obtained.  Figure (1) shows the 
shape of the policy frontier which, replicating that in Bean, is shown in the space of the 
                                                 
6 Bean uses the result that if X=BX-1+E where B is a conformable matrix and E is a vector noise process, then 
)] X ( Var [ Vec )] B B ( 1 [ )] X ( Var [ Vec 1 − ⊗ − = .  5
standard deviations of output and inflation.  The outcomes for two different values of β, 
β=0.3333 and β=3, are shown and can be seen to be ‘close’ as described in the introduction. 
 
2.1  The Effect of Parameters Estimates and Lag Structure on Rectangularity 
 
In figure 1, we use the set of parameter estimates obtained by Bean (1998) in his original 
empirical investigation.  These are ση = 1.55 and σε = 1.25 for the demand and supply shocks 
respectively and α = 0.492.  We find that the rectangularity property is robust to realistic 
alterations in the parameter values and lag structure of the model (accordingly, we use Bean’s 
parameter estimates in all subsequent figures
7).  To examine the effect of lag structure, we 
consider the following alternative equations for demand and supply respectively: 
 
η λ µ + + − = −1 y r y          ( D 2 )  
ε α π π + + = − y 1          ( S 2 )  
  
In (D2) the lag in interest rates has been removed so policy affects output 
contemporaneously, while in (S2) the lag in output has been removed so output affects 
inflation contemporaneously.  If we consider the two economies (S1) & (D2) and (S2) & 
(D1), we find that the property of rectangularity remains. In both of these economies, policy 
affects inflation with a one period lag: this is enough to ensure that the policy frontier 
becomes vertical as the preferences of the authority tend to pure inflation targeting, since 
policy cannot mitigate to any extent the contemporaneous supply shock.  Only in the 
unrealistic model (S2) & (D2), where policy acts without lags and the fact that policy can 
control the contemporaneous supply shock implies that the policy frontier does not become 
vertical in the limit, is the shape of the policy frontier noticeably less rectangular.
8  Figure (2) 
shows the shapes of the policy frontier for all these various models together with the 
outcomes for β=0.3333 and β=3. 
 
3.  The Optimal Rule with Discounting 
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7 A rectangular frontier is obtained from wide ranges of parameter values.  Details available from the authors. 
8 In the model without lags, and for small values of β, decreasing persistence in inflation in the model further 
reduces rectangularity.  This is very much not the case in the model with lags, see footnotes 1 and 9.  6
Note that when the monetary authority minimises (L1) the long run mean of both variables is 
zero, and so this is the same as minimising (L2) in the limit as δ →1.  Our analysis in this 
section proceeds in three stages. First we identify two mechanisms by which the introduction 
of discounting can affect optimal policy. Secondly we show that as an authority becomes 
more patient, both of these mechanisms cause the authority to be more concerned with 
controlling inflation regardless of its initial preferences. Thirdly we describe the effect of this 
on the sensitivity of policy to the weighting of the objective function.  The sensitivity of 
policy to the weighting of the objective function is now primarily what we refer to when we 
discuss property of rectangularity, rather than the shape of the frontier; the shape of the policy 
frontier in terms of the long-run variances of output and inflation will not change when 
discounting is introduced. However, the shape of policy frontier in the space of short-run 
variances of output and inflation is much less rectangular, as seen below. 
 
With discounting, the optimal rule must still take the same form (1) as above, but the 
feedback parameter ρ will now be a function of both β and δ.  Allowing discounting alters 
optimal policy in two ways.  In this system, interest rates affect output with a one period lag 
and inflation with a two period lag.  Since policy now affects output and inflation with 
different lags, changing the discount factor acts to change the relative weight on output in the 
loss function: for a given β, as the authority becomes more myopic, it becomes more 
concerned with output stabilisation since it can only influence inflation at a longer horizon. 
We will call this mechanism the ‘weighting mechanism.’  Discounting alters policy by 
another mechanism described below which we shall refer to as the ‘investment mechanism.’ 
To separate the effects of the two mechanisms, we make the following 
reparametrisation δ β β
~
= . Varying δ while holdingβ
~
constant then allows us to isolate the 
effect of the investment mechanism, since the relative weighting in the loss function on 
output and inflation deviations at the horizon at which they are affected by current policy 
does not then change. 
 
Since the optimal rule under discounting remains of the same form (1), the sequencing matrix 
also takes the same form (3) with respect to the feedback parameter.  Because of the lag 
structure, at time t the interest rate decision affects E[yt+1
2] and E[πt+2
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   2
2 2 2
2 ] [ ) 1 ( ] [ C y E t t t + + − = + π α ρα π        ( 7 )  
 
where the constants 
2
1 η σ = C and 
2 2 2
2 2 ε η σ σ α + = C .  Noting that  ] [ 1 + = + t t t E y π π α  we can 






1 ] [ ] [ C E y E t t + = + + π ρ         ( 8 )  
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Equations (8) and (9) provide the key to understanding the other effect of discounting on 
rectangularity (the ‘investment mechanism’). If we take E[πt+1] as given, the relative 
deviations of output and inflation will be determined by the feedback parameter: a high 
feedback parameter controls inflation but leaves output far from its target, whereas a low 
feedback parameter does the opposite.  This is the trade-off that a myopic (δ=0) authority 
faces.  However, the trade-off appears different for a long-sighted authority.  In the future, 
output and inflation deviations will depend not only on the value of the feedback parameter, 
but both depend on the expected deviation of inflation in preceding periods.  By getting 
inflation to target now, the authority reduces the expected deviations of both inflation and 
output in the future. Reducing inflation now can be seen as an ‘investment’ which creates 
long-term stability of both inflation and output. So as the authority looks to the future, 
regardless of whether it is primarily concerned with output or inflation stability, it becomes 
more concerned with controlling inflation in the present. Hence the policies of authorities 
with different preferences ‘converge’ as they become more far-sighted.
 9   
 
Note that in general, if the ‘sequencing’ matrix is of rank 1, there will be a particular linear 
combination of (expected) output and inflation on which both inflation and output depend. As 
an authority becomes more far-sighted, its policy will become more concerned with 
controlling this. Here, a far-sighted authority will control inflation more tightly than a myopic 
one and have a higher feedback parameter.  We now verify this.  It is shown in the appendix 
that using the above reparametrisation the feedback parameter is given by the equation: 
 
  () [ ] 0 1 ) 1 (
~ ~
1 2 = − + − + ρ α δ β δρ β α        ( 1 0 )  
 
For the optimal policy rule we take the positive root of (10), and it can be seen that this lies in 
the range  ] , 0 [ 1
α . Note that for the case δ =1 equation (10) gives the feedback parameter given 




                                                 
9 This ‘investment’ argument depends on there being some persistence in inflation.  One might then imagine that 
removing persistence from the system would reduce rectangularity. This is not so: while reducing persistence in 
inflation decreases the strength of the investment mechanism, in a model with lags it also reduces the trade-off 
between output and inflation.  Without any persistence, the policy frontier is upward sloping and policy 
completely insensitive to preferences.  To see this, make the following observation.  If a policy maker cares only 
about output stability she just uses interest rates to control demand.  If she cares about inflation as well, she uses 
output to reduce the persistence in inflation (see footnote 1) thereby increasing the volatility of output.  This is 
the trade-off.  If there is no persistence in inflation however, she has no need to do this; minimising output 
volatility then minimises inflation volatility.  Persistence causes the trade-off, but also introduces a mechanism 
by which discounting alters the optimal policy outcome.  8




2 1 = − + + − + ′ α ρ ρ β α δ β δρ β ρ α       ( 1 1 )  
 
Since the term in the square brackets is strictly positive and  ] , 0 [ 1
α ρ ∈ , it follows that ρ is an 
increasing function of δ. Unless the weighting objective function is such that it corresponds 
to a case of pure inflation targeting or pure output stabilisation, ρ is a strictly increasing 
function of δ. The investment mechanism augments the weighting mechanism: the more 
patient the authority the tighter is the policy in controlling inflation. 
 
3.1   Discounting in an Alternative Framework 
 
As discussed above, the weighting mechanism relies on the fact that policy affects output and 
inflation at different horizons.  Suppose we wanted to consider the effect of discounting on a 
system where policy affected both output and inflation at the same horizon.  Consider for 
example the system (S2) & (D1) which as seen in figure (2) has the property of rectangularity 
when there is no discounting.  We refer to this as the ‘one-lag’ case. The optimal rule now 
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where 
2
1 η σ = C and 
2 2 2
2 ε η σ σ α + = C   
 
Here there is no weighting mechanism but the investment mechanism remains the same: it 
can be shown that the feedback parameter is given by an equation identical to (10) save for 
the reparametrisation made above:
10 
 
  () [] 0 1 ) 1 ( 1 2 = − + − + ρ α δ β βδρ α        ( 1 4 )  
 
3.2  Policy Equivalence Curves 
 
We can summarize as follows: the system of equations for output and inflation determines 
how policy affects the sequencing matrix. This dictates the form of the optimal rule in terms 
of a feedback parameter that is constant over time.  Once the form of the optimal rule has 
been determined, it only remains to solve for the feedback parameter to specify policy 
precisely. The feedback parameter is a function of the parameters β  and  δ, respectively 
preferences over inflation and output stability, and the level of discounting.   
 
                                                 
10 Details available from the authors.  9
Ignoring the weighting mechanism and considering the one-lag case for the moment, the 
feedback parameter is given by equation (14). Then treating ρ as fixed in (14) we can then 
plot curves in ( β, δ ) space which are the locus of points which yield equal values of ρ and so 
equivalent policy rules.  We refer to these as ‘policy equivalence’ curves.  Figure (3A) shows 
a series of such curves for equation (14).  Bearing in mind that these curves are contour lines 
representing equal values of ρ and that contours with lower values of ρ correspond to higher 
values of β, figure (3A) demonstrates graphically the result derived above, that for a given 
value of β the feedback parameter is increasing in δ i.e. that policy becomes tighter as the 
authority becomes more far-sighted. 
 
We can also see that as the authority becomes more far-sighted and δ increases, changes in β 
result in smaller changes in the feedback parameter.  As argued above, when the authority is 
far sighted, the weighting of the objective function matters less in the formation of policy. 
Figure (3B) shows the results in the original Bean framework using equation (10) where the 
weighting mechanism is taken into account; we can see that both these features remain, only 
the effect is more dramatic. 
 
4.  The Implications for Rectangularity 
 
How do we assess the implications of these results for rectangularity? As an example, we can 
calculate the completely myopic feedback parameter in the one-lag case when δ=0 i.e. when 







= 2          ( 1 5 )  
 
The short run policy frontier given by (12) and (13) in { E[yt+1
2] , E[πt+1
2] } space depends on 
the current level of inflation, particularly its magnitude relative to the standard deviation of 
the supply and demand shocks. It is easy to see that this will not be rectangular.  Figure 4A 
shows how the short-run policy frontier shifts outwards as the current level of inflation 
increases, with the policy outcomes marked for β=0.3333 and β=3. 
 
Suppose a social planner who did not discount the future wanted to consider the impact of not 
specifying the weighting of the objective function of her myopic monetary authority.  Would 
similar outcomes result from a wide range of weightings? To address this question, we use 
the myopic feedback rule for different values of β to calculate the long-run variances of 
inflation and output. Note that in the space of long-run variances, since the form of the 
optimal rule is the same except for the value of the feedback coefficient, the shape of the 
policy frontier will remain unchanged.  The effect of myopia is shown on the distance  10
between outcomes for two different values of β; these can be seen for β=3 and β=0.3333 in 
figure 4B for the one-lag case.
11 The filled circles show the outcomes for a perfectly far-
sighted authority, whereas the hollow circles show the outcome for myopia, and as can be 
seen these are appreciably further apart.  When the authority is myopic outcomes are more 
sensitive to differences in the weighting. 
 
In his original analysis Bean provides an analysis of the ‘excess loss’ that results from the 
authority choosing the ‘wrong’ β in calculating the feedback coefficient.  Supposing for 
instance that a social planner has a particular value of β, say β=1, the excess loss diagram 
shows the percentage excess loss, from the point of view of the planner, when policy is 
implemented by an authority with a weighting β*.  In the case with discounting, we can 
augment this analysis by supposing that the planner and the authority each have their own 
discount rate.  Supposing that the planner does not discount the future (i.e. δ=1), figure 5A 
shows the excess loss from the planner’s point of view both for an authority with δ=1 and for 
an authority with δ=0.65 in the one-lag case
12; figure 5B shows the corresponding diagram 
for the two-lag case.  In both diagrams, the dashed line shows the loss function when the 
authority does not discount, and the continuous line when it does. We can see from the policy 
equivalence curves in figure 4, that when the authority and the social planner have differing 
discount rates, the excess loss of the social planner will be zero for a particular weighting of 
the authority’s objective function β* with β*≠1.  This is verified in figure 5.  As we can see, 
consideration of the relative discount rates can be important in the excess loss rates; when the 
authority does not discount the future excess loss rates are relatively low for a wide range of 
values of β* whereas when the authority does discount, the excess loss can be much higher.  
 
5.   Conclusions 
 
Whilst it is true in general that a ‘rectangular’ policy frontier implies that similar policy 
outcomes are obtained from a wide range of weightings of the objective functions, it should 
be emphasised that an important implication of rectangularity of the policy frontier is that it 
makes sense for the central bank to concern itself with output volatility to at least some 
strictly positive extent.  As can be seen in figure 1, a central bank that purely targets inflation 
will not exploit the rectangularity of the policy frontier; it will obtain an outcome at the point 
A whereas it might be considered socially desirable to be in the general vicinity of B.  From 
                                                 
11 It is not helpful to consider a completely myopic authority in the two-lag case, since the authority will only 
care about output, and so we obtain ρ=0 and an infinite variance of inflation regardless of the value of β.  In 
general, however, because of the additional impact of the weighting mechanism, the sensitivity of outcomes to β 
is further heightened in the two-lag case when δ is small.  In the one-lag case discounting has relatively little 
impact on policy when β  is small but non-zero; this is not true in the two-lag case because of the weighting 
mechanism.  11
point A, large gains in output stability can be obtained by compromising to a small degree on 
inflation volatility, since the slope of the policy frontier becomes vertical at point A.   
 
The implications for rectangularity of discounting may be summarised as follows.  When the 
authority is myopic, it focuses on the short-run policy frontier which is not rectangular.  The 
authority cares less about inflation the more it discounts the future, and its actions become 
increasingly sensitive to the weighting of its objective function.  From the point of view of a 
social planner who does not discount the future, large excess losses can be generated by not 
obviously implausible combinations of β and δ for the authority. 
 
What does this say about the way in which an authority’s remit should be specified? Suppose 
society wants to achieve on outcome at A on the long-run policy frontier.  This can be 
achieved easily – the authority should engage in pure inflation targeting and whether it 
discounts the future or not is irrelevant since discounting has no effect on the actions of an 
authority that purely targets inflation. However, if society wants to exploit the rectangularity 
of the long-run frontier and achieve an outcome in the vicinity of B, then it does become 
important to consider the discount rate of the authority.  Given mixed targeting and no 
discounting, rectangularity implies that we are fairly likely to end up at B.  Of course 
discounting per se does not imply an outcome away from B; were the authority targeting 
inflation excessively at the expense of output stabilisation, increased discounting could help 
achieve an outcome at B.  With discounting however, policy outcomes become more 
sensitive to the value of β, and again many not obviously implausible combinations of β and 
δ can result in an outcome far from B. This is particularly true of the two-lag case where the 
‘weighting mechanism’ plays an additional role.   
 
Since the relative weighting of a monetary authority’s objective function is often not 
specified in its remit, as in the U.K. case, agents in the economy in general may not have a 
precise idea of the authority’s β.  When it discounts the future less, the actions of the 
authority become less sensitive to the value of β and ought to be more predictable, so stability 
is likely to be improved when the authority is patient. So, provided the authority does not 
target inflation excessively, arrangements that decrease myopia
13 ought to result in greater 
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12 The reason we consider that such a low discount factor (or high discount rate) might be plausible is for the 
reasons mentioned in the introduction: that members of the MPC serve a term of three years, so the average 
remaining term is one and a half years; and that a period in the model corresponds to around one year.  
13 For instance for the U.K., by increasing the length of service on the MPC.  12
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From equations (8) and (9) in the main text, we can see that Vt will have the form: 
2
1 2 0 ] [ + + = t t E A A V π              ( A 3 )  
Substituting equations (8), (9) and (A2) into the right hand side of (A2) we get: 
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Using the envelope theorem, we can then obtain the first order condition for ρ : 






A + − =         ( A 5 )  
Comparing the coefficient of E[πt+1]







) 1 ( 1 ρ β δ ω
ρα + + − = A A   
Substituting for  ρ β
~
from (A5) gives  
  () ) 1 ( 1 2 2 δ ω
ρα A A + − =        ( A 6 )  
Comparing (A5) and (A6) we can see that  ( ) 2 ~ A β ω
α ρ = .  Substituting this into (A5) gives  
  () () [ ] 0 1 ) 1 (
~ ~ 2 = − + − + ρ δ β δρ β ω
α
α
ω        ( A 7 )  
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Figure 1  The Bean Policy Frontier 
 
Figure 2 Lag Structure 
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Figure 3  A. Policy Equivalence Curves  
 
 






Figure 4    A.  Short-Run Policy Frontiers 
 
B. Long-Run Policy Frontiers – Myopic and Far-Sighted Outcomes 
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